M
iller (1997) presents a computerized method of text content analysis for vexing issues, based on the theory of frame mapping (Entman, 1991) . Fan (1997) introduces a content analysis to assess news coverage in a particular direction, using a user-calibrated algorithm. Other analyses even take account of emotion (Whissell, 1996) . In a growing literature on computer-assisted textual analysis (West, 1998) , discrepancy between the literature's labeling of a camp of opinionholders and textual content within-camp is often bypassed in favor of direct analysis of their texts. Here, this discrepancy, or mislabeling of some opinionholders within a camp, itself constitutes the core issue. For example, in the abortion debate, how many World Wide Web texts said to be in the pro-choice camp actually are, and how many Web texts said to be in the pro-life camp actually are? This content analysis applied the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) computer language along with a publicly available search engine through a Web browser to address these questions.
If one's objective is the proportion of mislabeling in the entire body of literature of a given camp, rather than in the mislabeling of only individual texts, then a condition exists under which camps pro-choice, pro-life, and third camp are also exhaustive in addition to mutually exclusive. This condition occurs when all other forms of middle ground are relatively sparse in the body of literature. Under this condition, the proportion of correct labels in each camp can be estimated as follows. Let A be one of pro-choice or pro-life and B the other of the two. The probability that a camp is truly pro A = Pr(A) = Pr(A | label A) * Pr(label A) + Pr(A| label B) * Pr(label B) + Pr(A | label third camp) * Pr(third camp). Also, Pr(A | label A) + Pr(B | label A) + Pr(third camp|label A) = 1. If virtually no pro-choicers write texts supporting pro-life and no pro-lifers write texts supporting pro-choice, then Pr(A | label B) = Pr(B | label A) ≈ 0. Therefore, "A-ness" = Pr(A | label A) = 1 -Pr(third camp | label A). Similarly, "B-ness" = Pr(B | label B) = 1 -Pr(third camp | label B).
The identification of labeling A or B (setting aside the accuracy of the labels) is obviously objective by a methodology that simply searches for keywords in the text, with any appropriate adjustments for confusing language. Keywords applicable to third camp flag phases of pregnancy. However, unlike the flagging of labels A and B, some keywords for phases of pregnancy may occur, at some frequency, in literature even when the opinionholders are not trading off A versus B. These "false flags" should occur no more than keywords flag phases of pregnancy in literature discussing the subject of pregnancy but uninvolved in the debate. The only way for someone to advocate a pro-choice phase and a pro-life phase would obviously be to mention one or more of the phases of pregnancy. By the same token, sometimes these phases are mentioned apart from any form of abortion trade-off.
Consider three communities of opinionholders, each discussing the same debate. The debate need not be abortion. One of the three communities is discussing a process that unfolds over several months in general, and particular weeks of the process here and there, but is "out of the loop" of the A/B debate. The second community is involved in the A/B debate and mentioning specific weeks of the process but no more frequently on average than the first. The third community is also involved in the A/B debate and mentioning specific weeks but mentioning these weeks even more frequently on average than the first. In this case, the third community has no reason (apart from third camps disguised as A/B) for extended discussion that requires mentioning specific weeks more often than the first community. Clearly, the third community is showing an internal proclivity toward third camp. When A, B, and third camp are mutually exclusive and exhaustive camps, as they logically must be, that internal proclivity toward third camp (for A or B) reflects mislabeling within the camp. Even when only mutually exclusive but not exhaustive, the rate of third camp within A or B is still proportional to mislabeling within A and B.
For the abortion debate, there appear to be two and only two options for third camp. Option 1 is to define third camp as a timeline trade-off form of middle ground, in which the turning point from pro-choice rights to pro-life rights should occur neither at the outset of the 9 months nor at the end of the 9 months but should occur between the beginning and the end of pregnancy. The trimester framework of Roe v. Wade (1973) explicitly proclaims a timeline, even though Doe v. Bolton (1973) , which was pronounced by the same court on the same day, ignored and attached no importance to the timeline aspect of Roe v. Wade. This fact helps explain why one camp and not the other defends Roe, whereas the other camp opposes rather than defends Roe. Notice that it would be contrary to the definition of A, B, and third camp if it were possible that one could advocate a transition from A to B during the course of pregnancy while being actually in A or B. Historically, people have chosen to understand the Roe v. Wade court in terms of an abortion rights opinion.
Option 2 is to define third camp as any middle ground. The problem here is that these other middle grounds for the abortion debate have nowhere near the impact and visibility of a timeline trade-off form of middle ground. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) and other decisions since Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor refers back to and emphasizes viability and other timeline trade-offs at the determination of the state. In the sciences, panels of scientists have drafted very different laws about what can or cannot be legally done involving the embryo or fetus from the abortion clinic depending on timeline considerations. So if in the Supreme Court and in the blue ribbon panels of scientists, the central concept of a timeline arises repeatedly, then there exists strong a priori reason to believe that the timeline compromise is quite prevalent and may even predominate the political landscape. At the time of Roe v. Wade (1973) , this timeline-specific third camp had only nominal acceptance even within the Supreme Court itself; but increasingly, timeline considerations have grown and flourished. There is such a gap between how often the Supreme Court and blue ribbon panels of scientists discussing related issues refer to (a) the timeline aspects and to (b) other aspects, that whatever belongs in the category b is so far behind that no particular "middle" proposal springs easily to mind.
Why does it even matter how sparse other middle grounds are? If our goal were to classify individual pieces of literature, then it would certainly matter. But the goal of this study is not to classify individual pieces of literature, but to measure the presence of the third camp in the midst of pro-lifers and pro-choicers. Even if the positions represented by third camp amid these other camps is to seek compromise, it is important to unmask their true nature as camp C rather than accept imposters who are really camp C in the midst of camps A or B. So many tens of thousands of articles exist in all the literature that it would take a large number of articles discussing third camps besides the timeline-oriented one to notice the change in this proportion. If other middle grounds were prevalent, then the number of these imposters would be more difficult to determine. As it is, there should be routine scientific obstacles to overcome, less so the ones a person usually thinks of in terms of the abortion debate.
For three reasons, then, we should define third camp in exactly a certain way. First, mutually exclusive and exhaustive is necessary if the hope is to estimate pro-lifeness and pro-choiceness within labelings, if only indirectly. The timeline compromise provides the only such attempt at middle ground that has this property that the author could find. Second, again if one hopes to estimate pro-lifeness and pro-choiceness within labelings, then only third campness seems to lend itself to measuring objectively and not subjectively. Third, there are a priori reasons to believe that timeline compromise is very strong to the point where society may even be shrugging off pro-choice versus pro-life arguments entirely in favor of it. Do compromises on rape or incest have as great an impact as these? It seems unlikely that these policies are competing with recent decisions of the Supreme Court, nor are they competing with federal laws regulating the status of the embryo and fetus. For each of these three reasons, one should define third camp as the viewpoint of a turning point in the debate during the 9-month process of gestation.
To put the issue in its practical context, it would seem that pro-choicers are more mobilized for the early months of pregnancy, whereas pro-lifers are more mobilized for the final months of pregnancy. A mixed company (pro-lifers, pro-choicers, theoretically neutral people, unknown affiliation people, etc.) will often respond in one way to the mention of abortion for a pregnancy in its 1st or 2nd month, but differently (as an ensemble) for a pregnancy in its 8th or 9th month, even though a number of individuals will obviously have zero differences in attitude. One would like to know if this phenomenon is the rule or the exception. Do we have a Web literature in which every month of pregnancy constitutes the same debate, or do we have a Web literature in which some of the months of pregnancy loom higher than others in importance for the source of that opinion, whether the particular opinion is pro-choice, pro-life, or other. Does the Web literature portray the abortion question more as the same debate at every gestation (so that this trade-off exists for a few but not many), or does it porPlatt / THIRD CAMPS IN THE ABORTION DEBATE 295 tray the abortion question more as a trade-off for which some months/weeks matter more and others less for whomever the opinion belongs (so that this trade-off exists for many or even most)? These answers provide an indirect and novel framework for addressing the problem of mislabeling in the literature.
Our overall null hypothesis is that the literature portrays the abortion debate as the same abortion rights versus antiabortion conflict more or less throughout pregnancy. The alternative hypothesis is that the literature presents the abortion debate as a trade-off between months of gestation pro-choice and months of gestation pro-life.
To address the inherent difficulty of counting how often "1st month," "26th week," and so forth get mentioned, without knowing how often these terminologies would be mentioned even if the alternative hypothesis were false, one expects how often each phase of pregnancy gets mentioned in discussions of pregnancy off-topic from the abortion debate to be comparable to how often each phase of pregnancy gets mentioned in discussions of pregnancy on-topic to the abortion debate. The expected counts yield a debate for which no week or month of pregnancy would consistently loom higher than any other.
METHOD
The following method was employed: 1. Using a publicly available search engine, the author drew a sample of abortion discussion from all sources. This sample contained content from the first four pages of each of 25 documents. Further pages (as in the 8.5" × 11" printed page) were discarded. From these four pages, keywords that specified calendar periods during the timeline on which pregnancy unfolds were identified. Redundant text from the same or different URL was disqualified. Call this the on-topic sample.
2. Using the same search engine, the author drew a sample of similar-sized texts from literature on pregnancy, such that none of the documents discussed abortion. Again, redundant texts that were from the same or different URL with the same content were disqualified; the author used only the first four pages. Call this the off-topic sample.
3. Using SAS, the author counted occurrences of timeline keywords (first week, 24th week, second trimester, etc.) in both the on-topic sample and in the off-topic sample. Because some texts had two or three printer pages, instead of projecting the keyword counts to how many would have occurred had there been four like pages, the author converted all counts into an empirical distribution for that text as explained below.
4. The author mapped all keywords to the same units (weeks pregnant), whether the source referred to weeks, months, trimesters, and so on. Each occurrence of a keyword was weighted as one if in weeks (1/4 if in months, 1/13 if in trimesters, etc.). The author weighted the data across each week of pregnancy so that the sum of these weights for that target keyword is the same no matter which transformation of the keyword (hours, days, weeks, months, etc.) is presented. Then the author divided each timeline keyword's total by the grand total to establish an empirical distribution.
5. From this point, all observations had the same units. For the statistical test explained in the Results section, the sample size is equal to the number of keywords (n = 40) and not the number of texts sampled.
RESULTS
For convenience, the Infoseek Advanced Search was chosen as the search engine. During the on-topic sampling, the search parameters were set as follows: Table 1 provides an overview of the texts that were collected. Table 2 outlines the SAS code used to count keywords. Counts were manually verified for miscategorization. Under the null hypothesis H0, one would expect the keywords to be distributed more or less as they are in the off-topic stratum, where there is discussion on pregnancy but no discussion on the abortion debate. So the question is the following: What probability is there that one would draw (purely by chance) our particular sample of keywords in the on-topic stratum of interest (whether pooled, just camp A, or just camp B) from the off-topic stratum? If this probability attains statistical significance, then we can conclude that there is more timeline trading-off than one could expect if the camp were as labeled. The camp(s) whose documents refer to the calendar of gestation more often during the 40 weeks of pregnancy is (are) more likely to have a more uniform distribution of these references across weeks than the other camp(s) with fewer such calendar references. An empirical test of differences in distribution, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test, detected differences (p < .001) between distributions in each of four comparisons. For this test, the sample size is n = 40 (the number of keywords).
The study did not determine pro-choice texts versus pro-life texts but merely identified the labels. For example, one document said "National Right to Life Committee," which did not require great ingenuity to classify as pro-life. Likewise, another document was published by an abortion clinic, which again did not require ingenuity to classify as pro-choice. Most of the documents were in this "no-brainer" category. Any text that was not obvious or not self-labeled was called unknown, including one from the media. Comparing pro-choicers and the off-topic, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test yielded a test statistic of Ksa = 1.006, which is highly significant (Conover, 1971) . Similarly, comparing pro-lifers and the off-topic yielded a KSa = 1.23, which is highly significant. Comparing the entire on-topic distribution to the off-topic yielded a KSa = 1.453, again highly significant. Even if those involved in the abortion debate who are unknown in affiliation are removed from the sample, the KSa = 1.342, once again highly significant. To estimate the proportion of correct labels in each camp, it is clear that Pr(mislabel) is proportional to the rate of timeline keywords per page observed and inversely proportional to the rate per page expected. Those on-topic texts that have lower keyword rates than predicted can be taken as a model of Pr(mislabel) = 0. Similarly, by titrating different numbers of documents whose keyword rates are greater than the rate expected ("contaminated" by third camp) back into the model of Pr(mislabel) = 0, the Pr(mislabel) for Pr(mislabel) > 0 can be linked to a particular ratio of observed over expected. For example, if one text with double or greater the rate expected is combined with the four texts in the model of Pr(mislabel) = 0, then the ratio of the two rates calculated from the aggregate combination provides a model of Pr(mislabel) = (1 bad text/ 5 total texts) = 0.2. Similarly, a different choice of the contaminating text provides another data point for Pr(mislabel) = 0.2. This process can be repeated for two contaminating texts at a time, in which case Pr(mislabel) = (2 bad texts / 6 total texts) = 0.333.
From grouping many different combinations of documents, 26 points were plotted showing the ratio of keywords rate expected to rate observed on one axis against the Pr(mislabel) on the other axis. This plot allowed for the proportion of mislabels to be regressed against the ratio of the observed rate to the expected rate, using the algorithm called Proc GLM in SAS. For this regression, because as {rate observed → rate expected} implies {Pr(mislabel) → 0 < constant << 1}, the intercept is assumed zero. This regression estimated a slope of 0.19807 (SD = 0.01). Table 3 
CONCLUSION
One of the weaknesses of this study is that the counting of weeks and months required more manual intervention and quality control oversight than was initially anticipated. For example, the word week could occur in a text having the correct discussion but in that particuPlatt / THIRD CAMPS IN THE ABORTION DEBATE 299 lar instance the reference was to something other than pregnancy. Despite this weakness, the p values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test were highly significant, suggesting that unless a major flaw is discovered the conclusions will stand. These findings indicate that the model of the abortion debate in which pro-lifers stand at one corner and pro-choicers stand in the other is highly misleading. All the evidence suggests that texts in which the camp is falsely labeled are as prevalent as one in four (on the low side) or one in two (on the high side) even among those very camps. Such texts are written evidently by people who trade between pro-choice weeks, months, and so on of pregnancy and pro-life weeks, months, and so on of pregnancy. Do these figures suggest the existence of an incipient conventional wisdom on abortion, perhaps one that ought to be challenged from one or both corners of the debate? 
